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The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance: Identity, Performance, and Understanding
by Graham McFee. 2011. Binsted, Hampshire: Dance Books Ltd. xvii + 342 pp.,
appendix, bibliography, notes, index. $ 34.95 paper.

Graham McFee is one of the few philosophers who can be credited with helping to
pioneer and forge a path for dance as a fine art in the field of analytic aesthetics.1 His
1992 book, Understanding Dance, following Francis Sparshott’s 1988 book, Off the
Ground: First Steps to a Philosophical Consideration of the Dance, was a significant
introductory step towards situating dance in a field that has traditionally focused
primarily and nearly exclusively on painting, sculpture, literature and (more recently)
music.2 In general dance has not been taken seriously as a legitimate art form by the
philosophic Academy; indeed, it was originally excluded from Hegel’s system of the fine
arts (see Sparshott 1983). Analytic aesthetics has yet to fully recover from this historical
exclusion. The articles and books on dance in the field have been sporadic, often ad hoc,
and dance has yet to attract enough scholars of analytic aesthetics to sustain a robust
dialogue on what counts (or should count) as the key features of dance as art.
In light of this background it comes as no surprise that The Philosophical
Aesthetics of Dance, McFee’s follow-up to and extension of Understanding Dance,
draws heavily on the larger body of rigorous literature that exists in the analytic aesthetics
of both the concept of art in general and on music, the art that is perhaps closest to dance
given its performative, non-clearly-text-based, and often abstract nature. Although he
avoids one traditional focus of analytic aesthetics by refusing to provide a definition of
dance as art, eschewing the philosophical practice of constructing definitions that require

dance to be defined in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions (those conditions
without which dance could not be what it is and that distinguish dance from all other
forms of art) his book does cover a large portion of the other categories under which art is
discussed analytically (see 270). Its strengths for analytic aesthetics lie in his detailed
and in-depth discussions of what should count as a dance “work” of art (what McFee
calls a “dancework”) for purposes of numerical identification, appreciation and historical
preservation. Particularly helpful is his discussion of how a dancework should be
construed as: 1) neither “autographic” nor “allographic” under Nelson Goodman’s
categories in Languages of Art but a performable and re-performable artwork with a
certain history of production (see Part One); 2) an abstract, structural “type” for which
subsequent performances are “tokens” (see Part One, Part Four, and Appendix); 3) an
authored work created by a choreographer that has a historical identity, meaning and
continuity that should depend in part (although not exclusively) upon what the
choreographer intended (see Part Two and Part Four); 4) a work whose performances are
performed and interpreted by (but not created by) dancers (see Part Three); 5) an object
with perceptual artistic properties that is to be understood appreciatively and conceptually
(see xii, 150, and Part Four); 6) an intentional object that exists in a broadly institutional
context under a concept of art (see xiv, 150-152, 167-168, 272-278); and 7) an object that
can be reconstructed and re-performed under certain conditions (see Part Four).

Despite this heroic attempt, one might wonder whether an analytic philosophy of
dance as fine art construed under the traditional categories of analytic aesthetics
(constructed primarily with the creation of enduring entities such as paintings, sculptures

and poems in mind) are adequate to tell us something important, even metaphysically
important, about dance qua dance, an art form that McFee would undoubtedly admit is as
much characterized as being an ephemeral art as it is by the history of its enduring works
(see 96). Further, it could be suggested that it is precisely this ephemerality that provides
an exciting, immediate, have-to-be-there temporality to dance as art, and that it is this,
perhaps, rather than the enduring works, that accounts for dance’s unique character (see
Conroy 2012). McFee’s book, in contrast, suggests that ephemerality in dance is
primarily a problem responsible for causing works to vanish from the repertoire and that
this problem ought to be corrected through broader adaptation and use of dance notation.
Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that dance would benefit from teaching all its dancers
and choreographers to learn and use dance notation in their dance-making and learning
practices; the score could then, McFee posits, be treated as a normative recipe that
provides constraints on which performances (and features of performances) count as
tokens of the type (see 97, 101-105, and 160-163).
Notwithstanding the very real preservation problem involved in dance’s
ephemerality one might question here whether this enhanced focus on work identity and
history is something that serves the categorizing interests of analytic aesthetics more than
it serves the interests of dance as it is actually practiced and enjoyed. Perhaps there is
something to be celebrated in the personal, communal and tribal practices of dances being
taught and conveyed person-to-person in a way that is admittedly often messy,
disorganized and performer-influenced. And perhaps just as much is gained as lost when
translations and retellings are not duplicated exactly but embellished, tweaked and
changed with each new version of a dance that emerges.

Another possible problem is that even if one accepts the confines of the analytic
aesthetics terms of this discourse it is not clear that McFee is correct to hold that dance as
a fine art produces only works that are created to be performed and re-performed (160163). One might hold, as David Davies does, that a one-time improvised dance
performance, or part of a performance, even though it was not conceived in advance as
performable, or recorded later to be re-performed (what Davies calls a “workperformance”), can still be what he calls a “performance-work” of art rather than a nonart “happening,” as McFee characterizes it (see Davies 2011, 18-19 and 137-143 and
McFee’s The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance at 160). If so, then there may be a
repertoire of truly ephemeral danceworks or parts of danceworks that were intended to
vanish as soon as they were performed that McFee’s theory does not address. One can
only presume here that he would find these works to be even more problematic than those
that were intended to be re-performed and were lost to dance and art history. Again there
is missing a sense of any possible artistic and aesthetic virtue that might attend these
even-more-deeply ephemeral features of some dance performances.3
A related criticism of McFee’s account of dance as fine art is that perhaps there is
art in the performance of dance, even in those cases where there is an underlying and
continuing structure that can be properly credited to the choreographer as author. Here I
am envisioning the case where there is such a degree of expressive or stylistic features
that are imputed to a performance by a particular dancer that we may want to consider
that contribution to be creative, imaginative, thoughtful and originative in the way we
construe art-making to be, rather than merely the skilled application of dance as technical
craft. Indeed, in many cases there are features of danceworks that are appreciated by

dance critics, in practice, as relevant to understanding a dance as a form of art that are not
attributable to either “creation” by the choreographer or “interpretation” by the performer
but that can instead be viewed as a sort of artistic making by the performer. As Julie Van
Camp has pointed out:
Dance has no standard "division of labor." The choreographer can
provide more or less of the design details through individual
coaching. Every dancer necessarily "creates" when he [or she] adds
details not designed in advance by the choreographer. If the
choreographer does not indicate placement of the head or the
fingers, for example, the dancer must choose their placement
consciously or unreflectively. When a dancer substitutes his [or
her] own complete movement design for a certain passage instead
of just adding details to the choreographer's design, the dancer is
even more clearly acting as the creator of the movement, though
this still misleadingly might be considered interpretation (Van
Camp 1980, 30).
In this case, it might be that much of what we care about in a dance, and focus on for
purposes of artistic judgment and appreciation, is part of either a one-time performance of
a dance, or of the way that a dance performer conveys the piece, that may not be merely
an interpretation of what the choreographer has envisioned but something creatively new
that the dancer has added.
In short, it may be the case that a distinction can and should be drawn (and indeed
is drawn in critical and appreciative practice) between artistic contribution for purposes
of assignment of authorship to a work and artistic contribution as a matter of attributing
credit to who has contributed what to any given performance. It is by no means clear that
the division McFee attempts to draw between artistic (“creative”) and non-artistic
(“interpretive”) practices must line up with which features numerically identify a
dancework according to its essential, rather than manifest, properties (see Van Camp
1980, 30). “Art” may lie in whatever activity creates properties in the work that can be

critically appreciated as artistically relevant (e.g., expressive, stylistic features). In this
way a dancework may contain properties that we want to call “artistic” in order to
identify them as creative rather than interpretive that do not belong to the underlying
structure of the performance that continues in subsequent performances.
The final issue to be raised here by the approach taken by McFee in The
Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance is whether dance (even as a fine art) is best understood
through the heavily cognitive and conceptual sort of appreciation that McFee prescribes
(see 238-241). McFee dismisses all other ways of accessing dance, for example,
eschewing “subjective,” experiential, bodily and kinaestheic methods as either
“destructive” or not relevant to the philosophic understanding of dance as fine art (183187). If phenomenological approaches are not relevant to dance, if attempts to use
research from cognitive science in efforts to characterize the experience of dance are not
relevant either (see McFee’s dismissal of attempts to incorporate proprioception, the
mirror reflex and mirror neurons into our appreciation of dance at 188-205), then the
approach that McFee suggests seems narrow indeed. Even in the analytic aesthetics of
literature and music there is work being done to recognize the ways that the arts affect us
in emotional and in non-purely rational ways (see, e.g., Robinson 2007). Here someone
who is interested in dance in cognitive, appreciative and experiential ways (from both the
“studio point of view” and the audience point of view) might ask whether the benefits of
viewing dance in McFee’s way outweigh the cost of giving up focus on emotional
responses, visceral reactions and a full understanding of what is felt as well as cognitively
apprehended in our encounters with dance.4

Notwithstanding the criticisms above, The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance can
still be viewed as successful when understood on its own terms and for what it tries to do,
which is to show how dance can be construed in a coherent and well-supported way that
fits the fine art model as it has been conceived by analytic aesthetics. Even if one
chooses to approach dance in another way, it is certainly of some value to consider how
dance might belong not just in our social lives, our tribes, our temples, and our
communities, but as a fine art of the eighteenth-century, Western European sort. There
should be room in dance theory for an analysis like this of dance as part of high culture
that can be analyzed in cognitive, abstract, and intellectual ways as well as felt and
experienced in our blood, bones, sinews, nerves and hearts.
Aili Bresnahan
University of Dayton

NOTES
1

By “analytic aesthetics” I mean the methodological tradition that is practiced in
Western philosophy departments that focuses on dividing broad areas of inquiry into
discrete categories that allow for focused, specific and in-depth analysis within and
between these categories. Others who can be credited with bringing a discussion of
dance to the notice of analytic aesthetics include (and this list is by no means exhaustive)
Susanne K. Langer, Monroe C. Beardsley, Nelson Goodman, Adina Armelagos with
Mary Sirridge, Joseph Margolis, Francis Sparshott, Arnold Berleant, David Best, David
Carr, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Noël Carroll, Julie Van Camp, Renee Conroy, David
Davies and Anna Pakes. Other dance philosophers, historians and anthropologists, most
notably Selma Jean Cohen, Sondra Horton Fraleigh, Alfred Gell, Judith Hanna, Sally
Banes and Susan Leigh Foster, have also influenced how analytic aesthetics views dance,
as have many prominent dance critics.
2
Francis Sparshott followed this with an extensive and comprehensive attempt to
exhaust the field of analytic dance aesthetics in his giant tome, A Measured Pace,
published in 1995, No similar attempts have been made since then to provide a dance
text for use by analytic aestheticians.
3 McFee does not address Davies’ account here, but he is not to be faulted for that
given that Davies’ book was published in the same year as The Philosophical Aesthetics
of Dance (2011) and we cannot presume that McFee had access to his argument.

4

The “studio point of view” is the term used by Susanne Langer in Chapter 2 of
Feeling and Form (see page 15) to characterize the point of view of the artist making the
artwork, a view that is often opposed to or in conflict with the critic’s point of view.
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